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Abstract
In an effort to create new sociotechnical tools to
combat online harassment, we developed a scale to
detect and measure verbal violence within individual
tweets. Unfortunately, we found that the scale, based on
scales effective at detecting harassment offline, was
unreliable for tweets. Here, we begin with information
about the development and validation of our scale, then
discuss the scale’s shortcomings for detecting
harassment in tweets, and explore what we can learn
from this scale’s failures. We explore how rarity,
context, and individual coder’s differences create
challenges for detecting verbal violence in individual
tweets. We also examine differences in on- and offline
harassment that limit the utility of existing harassment
measures for online contexts. We close with a
discussion of potential avenues for future work in
automated harassment detection.

1. Introduction
Online harassment is a continuing problem,
endemic to many social media platforms and forms of
online computer-mediated communications. A
remarkable 40% of all adults and 32% of teenagers
connected to the internet have experienced at least one
type of online harassment [18,27]. For some people, the
experience of online harassment is ongoing, lasting for
weeks on end [30]. Though individuals who witness
online harassment may be apathetic toward it, those on
the receiving end are often extremely perturbed by the
experience [18].
Online harassment can have severely deleterious
effects on individuals. Among youths, cyberbullying is
associated with school violence, suicidal ideation,
offline victimization, substance abuse, as well as other
negative effects [28]. Studies of the effects of online
harassment on adult victims are not as numerous as
those focusing on teens and adolescents, but
mainstream media outlets frequently relay the stories of
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adult victims. As of late, in part due to an online
movement often characterized as a concerted effort to
harass women [see 28] media and academic attention to
online harassment have increased. A number of
recently publicized cases of harassment have been so
extreme that women have fled their homes for fear of
their safety [23,31,34]. In one particularly distressing
case, sustained online harassment may have been a
factor in a young woman’s suicide [13].
Within this paper, we report on the rationale for
and the process of developing a scale for measuring
verbal violence in individual tweets so that we may
eventually automatically detect malicious content. We
detail the problems we encountered that stemmed from
faulty assumptions and methodological problems, we
explain why it was difficult to reach appropriate levels
of agreement on what constituted verbal violence, and
we consider the utility of using Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) for scale validation purposes. We share
this experience with the hope that our mistakes may
help to steer others in the right direction. We close with
a discussion of avenues for future work in verbal
violence detection and measurement.

2. Background
Gender-based online harassment is not a new
occurrence and has been observed and recorded since
the early days of online computer-mediated
communications [25]. Popular platforms such as
Twitter that permit users to easily obfuscate their real
identities may beget such harassment [5,46]. That
harassing and abusive messages sent over the internet
can reach so many people in such a short time makes
managing such harassment an onerous task [11].
Manual reporting and commercial content moderation
(CCM) [see 34] are currently the most common
approaches to combatting harassment [14]. In this
model, it is either incumbent upon the victim or a thirdparty observer of harassment to report and/or manage
the harassing content. Automated detection efforts have
so far had limited success [see, e.g., ,15,35,41,45], but
machine learning approaches hold promise [35,39,40].
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Under the existing manual moderation model, the
burden too-often falls on underpaid CCM workers [36]
to act as gatekeepers, screening content (and seeing
everything) so that the end-user does not have to [37].
Harassment continues despite these in-place reporting
measures [30], which can exact a heavy toll on the
CCM workers tasked with evaluating content. These
workers are subjected to the worst that humanity has to
offer within online environments. They report a
multitude of emotional disturbances including
developing existential dread, intrusive imagery, and
desensitization to [12,36,37]. Mental health services are
often not provided to these workers [12]. We hoped to
devise more effective means of content moderation that
insulates both the would-be victims as well as the
content moderators from the effects of verbal violence.
By leveraging data generated by Twitter users to
increase our understanding of and ability to detect
toxicity and verbal violence as they occur on Twitter,
we hoped to develop sociotechnical tools for
combatting online harassment. Our initial approach
involved hand-coding content with the end-goal of
using human-labeled data to train machine-learning
classifiers to automate the detection and management
of malicious Tweets. Although, for a number of
reasons, our attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, we
gained a deeper understanding of just how complex
online harassment is as well as how difficult it is to
detect and manage.

3. Methods
3.1. Developing a scale
We identified individual tweets as an ideal place at
which to detect verbal violence. Individual tweets
constitute a discrete unit of analysis and the ability to
manage content at this level would be both useful and
computationally inexpensive. Despite the existence of
several decades’ worth of extant literature on online
harassment, we were unable to find any metrics of
harassment or cyber-aggression that could be readily
applied to individual tweets. As such, we endeavored to
create our scale.
There are existing approaches for detecting
harassment in online communities (such as Slashdot,
MySpace [45], and “social news” sites [41]), and for
user models on Twitter [16]. Our approach of coding
tweets for content, then using MTurk to code more
broadly, is in line with these other harassment detection
efforts. Literature shows that profanity is often used in
bullying attempts [12,41,45]. The automatic detection
and blocking of profanity would be relatively easy to
accomplish. However, that approach would yield many

false positives. Hence, we sought a solution that would
be sensitive to the context in which such keywords
occur. To accomplish this more complex task, we
decided to begin with human coders instead of
automated methods. Our plan was to use human coders,
able to capture these subtleties, in order to generate
training data for automated classifiers that could aid
moderators and users in the detection of violent content.
Our scale was designed to detect harassment [see ,35
for a report on binary [present/absent] harassment
detection] and to indicate the specific type of
harassment occurring.
Although there are studies that focus on
harassment occurring [30] and being discussed [4] on
Twitter, none offered insights into how we might
achieve context-aware harassment detection. As such,
we turned to psychological literature regarding online
harassment cyberbullying, aggression (both online and
in-person), and the measurement thereof.
A large body of scholarly work focuses on the
differences in individual traits and situational factors
that predispose individuals to perpetrate aggressions
[see 6,31]. The same trait differences that correlate with
aggression also relate to the perpetration of online
harassment [33]. In addition to the shared personality
correlates of offline-aggression and online harassment,
the dynamics of cyberbullying bear a close resemblance
to those of face-to-face bullying. In both cases, the
perpetrator intends to harm its victim [20]. Thus, online
harassment constitutes a human aggression [1].
Because online harassment is a manifestation of
aggression, we felt justified in modeling our scale on
existing measures of face-to-face aggression. We chose
to model our scale items primarily on the Buss-Perry
Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ) due to its high
reliability and internal consistency [10] and because it
has been used to check the criterion validity of existing
measures of cyber-aggression [11]. Several additional
items pertaining to doxing, rumoring, and the sending
of threatening reactions were adapted from the Cyber
Victim Bullying Scale (CVBS) [11] and the Facebook
Aggression Measure [33]. We objectified the language
used in the original scale items for use on tweets. For
example, we changed the BPAQ item “I can’t help
getting into arguments when people disagree with me”
to read as “User shares personal opinions about people,
groups, or institutions that the user disagrees with.”
This allowed for human coders to read a given tweet
and respond to each of the scale items on a Likert-style
scale where lower numbers indicate that the item is
uncharacteristic of the tweet and higher numbers
indicate that the item is characteristic of the tweet. We
omitted from our scale items from the BPAQ that could
not be objectified in a way that would allow for coding
by a third party. These included most of the items
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related to physical aggression (e.g. “Once in a while, I
can’t control the urge to strike another person”), as well
as some items related to hostility (e.g. “I wonder why
sometimes I feel so bitter about things”) [10]. We also
created an item related to ad hominin attacks based on
the number of such tweets we saw when reading
through our dataset. Our item pool initially consisted of
18 items and was eventually reduced to 14 items in the
final revision of the scale (see Table 1 for the final scale
items and their levels of agreement between coders).
It should be noted here that the BPAQ measures
trait aggression. In this approach, we had hoped that the
types of aggression observed in tweets would correlate
with the behaviors captured by the BPAQ. As we will
explain in this paper’s discussion, this approach was
unsuccessful.

3.2. Collecting data
Using TwitterGoggles [29], we collected millions
of tweets containing several hashtags, including but not
limited to #GamerGate and #NotYourShield. Because
of the media coverage of harassment coming from both
sides of the #GamerGate controversy, we believed that
#GamerGate tweets would provide an ideal population
of tweets for the development and testing of new means
to study and detect toxicity on Twitter.

3.3. Training human coders
We turned to MTurk to expedite the coding of our
dataset. Prior to hiring Turkers to participate in our
study, we received approval to do so from the Illinois
Institute of Technology’s institutional review board.
To gain eligibility for our tweet-coding tasks,
Turkers were required to complete an online training
program using Qualtrics and disseminated via MTurk.
The program consisted of three components. First,
Turkers were shown a mockup of the coding form for a
tweet already rated by the authors. Detailed
explanations of the authors’ rationale for each rating
were provided. When ready, Turkers proceeded to the
next page where they were given a blank coding form
and asked to rate the tweet from the previous page.
Turkers were not permitted to go back to the previous
section to check the authors’ ratings. Those who agreed
with the authors’ ratings on at least 12 out of the 14
scale items were permitted to move on to the final
component. The Turkers who performed satisfactorily
were then given a new tweet and another blank coding
form. This tweet had already been coded by the authors,
but Turkers were not permitted to know the authors’
ratings. Those whose ratings were in agreement with
our own on at least 12 out of the 14 items “passed” the

training program and were granted an MTurk
qualification that allowed them to work on subsequent
tweet-coding tasks. Instituting this program increased
between-coder reliability (see [22]). All participating
Turkers were compensated $2.50 through MTurk for
attempting the training program, which took an average
of ~14 minutes to complete.

3.4. Human coding
Once we reached reasonable reliability between
coders on our modified scale, we proceeded to have
human coders, recruited and trained through MTurk,
rate 900 tweets (see [14]) from our #GamerGate
dataset. Each tweet was coded only once. A total of six
human coders participated in the coding process (see
Table 2 for information about the coders). The coders
made a total of 10,771 “Uncharacteristic” ratings, 1,535
“Characteristic” ratings, and 294 “I’m not sure” ratings.
Turkers were paid $0.75 per tweet, each of which took
~1 minute to code. We also provided coders a large text
box in which to enter comments on their ratings, and we
provide many examples of those comments here.
Each coded tweet was given a composite
aggression score, accounting for each scale item that
was coded as being “characteristic” of the tweet.
Possible scores ranged from 0-14, with higher scores
indicating higher levels of aggression present in a tweet.
Aggression scores for the coded tweets ranged from 09 (M = 1.7, SD = 2.24). Using these 900 coded tweets
as training data, we hope to build machine-learning
classifiers for the scale items.

4. Explaining disagreements among
coders
The third column of Table 1 shows the degree to
which coders agreed with one another on a practice
round of coding tasks consisting of 20 tweets. Each of
the 20 tweets was coded by two independent coders. As
you can see, between-coder agreement varied greatly
by item. However, the average agreement score across
all 14 items reached 70%, which we felt was suitable
for a first pass at coding the dataset. We identified four
primary mechanisms for explaining the disagreement
between coders we witnessed: rare events, insufficient
context, questions of audience, and individuals’
perceptions.

4.1. Rare events
The two items with the highest level of betweencoder agreement are items 1 and 2 (see Table 1). This
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does not reflect the ease with which coders were able to
apply this item to tweets, but rather the fact that almost
no tweets in our dataset appear to be characteristic of
these two scale items. In our batch of 900 coded tweets,
only two tweets were coded as being characteristic of
either of these two items. To our surprise, both tweets
were coded as being characteristic of both items 1 and
2. Though both items are similar in that they relate to
threats of physical violence, one requires the threat to
not be made as a means to protect one’s rights, while
the other requires that the threat is not made for the
aforementioned reason.
Together, the practice-coding agreement levels and
the coding of these two items in the batch of 900 tell us
several things. First, the proportion of #GamerGate
tweets containing threats of physical violence appears
to be quite low. Second, it tells us that humans are
reliably able to agree on the absence of violent threats
in tweets but not the presence of violent threats. Given
the rarity of some kinds of harassment (e.g., threats of
physical violence), the agreement levels may
overestimate actual agreement because chance
agreement is so likely for uncharacteristic tweets. Even
when coders do detect violent threats and code tweets
accordingly, they are unable to discriminate between
the motives for the physical threats. This lack of
discrimination may be a function of the 140-character
limit imposed on tweets.
Similar to items 1 and 2, item 9 which related to
the public disclosure of private information (i.e.,
doxing) was rare within our coded sample (N = 2).
However, we suspect based on comments provided to
us by our coders that the actual rate of occurrence may
be slightly higher. One of our coders wrote,
It looks like this user may have shared
personally identifiable information and
embarrassing images of someone else, but that
info wasn't included in this particular
conversation so I didn't rate those sections as
characteristic.
Thus, it is important to note that the absence of
information, such as pictures, that was originally
included in a tweet but is now missing, may have
caused the misclassification of tweets on some items.

4.2. Insufficient context
Other sources of disagreement are likely related to
the lack of specific context human coders have access
to when reading a 140-character string of text which
may or may not include links to other text or images, or
to information about the author. We provided coders
with both the text from a tweet and the URL to view the

tweet online. We asked that coders follow the provided
links whenever possible to gain additional context (i.e.,
to see if a tweet is part of a thread to determine if it’s
argumentative), but we have no way to know if or how
often coders actually followed the links. We do know
that some coders followed the links, as we received a
number of comments from coders relating to dead-links
making tweets hard to code. Coders specifically
referred to difficulties relating to lack of context 42
times, and to dead links/missing content 107 times.
Another potential source of context (broadly) for
the tweets in our sample is knowledge about
#GamerGate. We did not ask our coders to rate their
level of familiarity with #GamerGate, as we were
concerned that seeing references to #GamerGate before
coding would prime individuals with strong opinions to
code differently. However, our attempt to avoid
priming effects may have introduced more variance into
our rating dataset. For instance, ratings for the scale
items for which between-coder agreement was less than
70% may have been influenced by the coders’
knowledge of #GamerGate. This conclusion is
supported by a number of comments provided by Coder
2, for example:
Rated 13 & 14 as characteristic because both of
this user's tweets in the conversation seem to
indicate that the user thinks GamerGate is
being misrepresented as a group that dislikes
games.
If it's not clear, I rated #14 characteristic
because the user is defending their (and other
pro-Gamergate individuals’) stance as being
for ethical journalism instead of against women
in gaming.
Clearly, her ratings are influenced by her
understanding of the differences between the two main
sides involved in the #GamerGate controversy. The
effects of the lack of prior understanding of the topic
can best be shown by explaining the coding of a tweet
that requires prior knowledge. Take the following tweet
text, for instance:
New to #GamerGate? We love inclusivity &
diversity. Notice how our opponents are all left
wing authoritarians, telling you what to think?
[32]
If you are familiar with #GamerGate, you realize
that the statement about the nature of gamergaters (love
inclusivity and diversity) is likely in response to
comments by the media and by other Twitter users
suggesting otherwise. If so, this tweet may be
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characteristic of items 11-14, depending on how one
interprets the items. It may also be considered
characteristic of item 5, if one considers the act of
providing contrary information to be equivalent to
engaging in an argument. Or, the tweet is a sarcastic
response mocking gamergaters and could be coded
characteristic of items #5 and #11. Without an
understanding of the issues surrounding #GamerGate,
however, it is unlikely that a coder would rate any of
these items as being characteristic of this particular
tweet.

4.3. Promotion and audience
Sarcasm is just one challenge to interpreting the
text of a tweet. Coders commented on a number of
Twitter conventions that figured into their decisions
about what codes to assign. For instance, they disagreed
whether posting a link necessarily implies support for
the content at the link. Coders commented:
Linked article suggests unfair treatment of
twitter poster's group. Linking of article is tacit
defense of tweeter's group and image.
and
The tweet itself may not be inflammatory or
contain any opinions, but the link itself does.
Since this person is trying to spread the link,
then regardless of whether they actually wrote
up the content in that link I think this tweet
counts as inflammatory and retaliatory content.
While another said,
The links themselves are definitely pro-GG and
share some opinions of the opposing side, but
because this user seems to just be posting these
links to be “informative” and doesn't directly
share any opinions of his own I didn't rate this
tweet as being inflammatory in any way.
It was difficult for coders to decide whether
sarcastic or informative tweets constituted attempts to
start an argument. The conventions around link sharing
in Twitter are developing, and these comments
highlight the challenge in detecting whether posting a
link is supportive. Some of that detection boils down to
context as mentioned earlier, but we saw other Twitterrelated disagreements that indicate something unique
about Twitter (and it’s #GamerGate discussions
specifically) are at play here: publicness.

As one coder points out, tweets are public even
when they contain @mentions or @replies:
Just wanted to make a point about the "starting
an argument" question. In this instance the
tweeter is responding directly to someone he
sides with. However, I'm taking the tweet to be
"public" and therefore readable by, and
somewhat directed at, people not necessarily in
agreement with his comments…I'm assuming
that because tweets are public, they are de facto
made to the broader population, especially
when they include a hashtag, and not just the
individual person they might be addressed to or
responding to.
The public nature of tweets complicates the
question of audience, and for topics such as harassment,
the audience is of particular importance. Twitter
accounts and users can conflate individuals and groups
when assigning authorship to tweets, further
complicating the notion of audience. For instance,
accounts for companies, celebrities, and politicians are
at once individual and institutional. What it means for
an institution to be the target of harassment was an issue
our coders faced:
If it was directed at an individual it wouldn't be
characteristic. But since it's directed at a
company, whose reputation is partly tied to
their business, I chose not sure.
Whether or not a post or link constitutes promotion
and how to judge whether a target or author is a group
or individuals are problems unique to the online context
of harassment.

4.4. The eyes of the beholders
Another source of between-coder differences in
ratings may result from individual differences. A oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that there is
a small but significant difference between the overall
aggression scores of tweets coded by women versus
those coded by men. Women find, on average, tweets
to be more aggressive (F(1,898) = 10.286, p = .001).
This difference is compatible with findings that women
are better able than men to detect more subtle forms of
aggression (i.e., microaggressions), possibly because
women are, unfortunately, more likely to have
personally
experienced
certain
types
of
microaggressions [2]. Women are also more likely to
accurately (based on legal definitions) perceive a wider
range of potentially ambiguous behaviors as
harassment [38].
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However, this observed difference in our data is not
necessarily a function of gender. It may be the case that
women were simply given more aggressive (according
to our scale) tweets to code than men were. It is difficult
to make definitive conclusions given the small number
of coders we employed and the number of tweets they
coded.
Other cognitive factors related to individual
differences in the perception of aggression are likely at
play as well. Perceptions of external stimuli appear to
be influenced by individuals’ attributions of intent.
Hostile attributional bias refers to a tendency for some
individuals to interpret ambiguous stimuli as being
intentionally aggressive and is found in both children
and adults [17,19]. Additionally, people with angry or
anxious dispositions are more likely to interpret
ambiguous prose as being negative [43]. It is possible
that our coders fell within one of these populations.
However, given the rarity of such events, it seems more
reasonable to infer that coders may underestimate the
harassment that occurs rather than overestimate it.
We initially thought it possible that different users
found various tweets “funny” rather than “malicious”
or “violent,” but existing research suggests that people
generally agree when sexual humor is offensive [24].
We do not know, however, how people decide whether
other types of humor are offensive rather than funny. In
the #GamerGate dataset, posts about where a person
lives, how many friends a person has, and whether a
person does drugs or engages in other illegal activities
are also mentioned (in addition to sexual content). Our
coders were not sure what to do with these kinds of
tweets, as evidenced by this comment:

data, the lack of context and the variation in individual
perceptions of malicious content pose potentially
insurmountable challenges for this “individual tweets”
approach to manual harassment coding. Without
reliable labeled data, it will be difficult to construct
supervised learning classifiers using this approach.
Given the rarity of harassment relative to all kinds
of posts on Twitter, 900 tweets were likely not enough
data to train an automated classifier effectively.
However, 900 tweets were enough to reveal some
patterns in disagreement between coders, as we have
described above. Coding more tweets could potentially
increase our ability to detect harassment, but it is not
clear, given all the kinds of disagreement we
documented, that the marginal benefits of doing so are
worth the costs (in either computation or Turker time).

5.1 Labelling users versus labelling content

We found that individual tweets were not reliably
categorized by multiple coders, at least not using
existing measures of harassment. While the “rare
events” problem could potentially be solved with more

Existing tools take the “individual user” approach
to content control. For instance, Twitter currently
provides a blocking1 feature that allows a user to
prevent others from following them and a muting2
feature that prevents another users’ content from
appearing. Both of those features operate at the user
level. Rather, we were trying to label content, so that
new tools would allow users to avoid certain types of
posts instead of avoiding certain users altogether. This
content approach would be useful in a number of
scenarios including
• doxing – if I mute an account who doxes me, I
won’t know it happened
• disagreement – I may be willing to engage in
arguments as long as I’m not being physically
threatened.
The “individual tweets” approach to detecting
verbal violence assumes that an individual utterance
can be violent (or at least exhibit violent characteristics)
without labeling the speaker “violent.” The BPAQ [10],
on which our scale is based, is a measure of trait
aggression and considers aggression as a personality
trait assumed to be correlated with acts of aggression.
Our results indicate that violent traits in content are not
readily analogous to violent traits in people. We used
this approach in order to avoid labeling individual users
as “violent,” but it was challenging for coders to detect
violence in the absence of information about the users
and their other behaviors and opinions.
Prior research on cyberbullying has also taken a
user approach, labeling users as bullies and even using
content from multiple platforms to build user models
[15,16]. Labeling users also risks a “whack-a-mole”

1

2

The tweet is an allusion to speculation that […]
a gaming journalist […] was using cocaine at a
press conference (I believe E3). I consider this
in the grey area of posting a potentially
reputation-damaging rumor, because while that
rumor could certainly be reputation-damaging,
the post seems to be mostly made in jest.
This comment also indicates that tweets made in
jest are not real in their consequences–the potential to
damage one’s reputation is mitigated by the jest here.

5. Discussion

https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063

https://support.twitter.com/articles/20171399
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problem in which individual accounts are abandoned as
soon as they are labeled “bullies,” and the offending
user just opens new accounts to continue the behaviors.
Labeling content has the potential to enable us to build
tools that let users set individualized thresholds for
particular types of tweets without encouraging
throwaway account creation.

5.2. Translating existing measures of
computer-mediated communication
A number of items on existing harassment
measures were poor fits for user-generated content.
This finding bodes poorly for the method of adapting
existing measures of aggression, cyber-aggression, and
cyberbullying for Twitter. Rather than using items from
existing scales, it may be beneficial to create items
based on the types of harassment actually observed in
the data.
For example, item #10 (attacking credibility in
order to undermine) was created based on our
observations of the data and was a better fit than many
of the items adapted from other measures. In contrast,
the distinction between items 1 and 2 did not translate
from offline to Twitter. We suggest that future attempts
at measuring verbal violence on Twitter take a “bottom
up” or grounded approach in which coders first identify
the kinds of harassment occurring and then build a
model. Further, validity is always a concern when using
or developing measures of personality [26]. Avoiding
adapting personality measures in favor of a grounded
approach reduces the possibility of having a highly
reliable but invalid measure.

6. Conclusion and future work
We have discussed how rarity, context, audience,
and individual differences create challenges for
detecting verbal violence in individual tweets. We have
also identified differences in how on- and offline
harassment unfold, thus limiting the utility of adapting
existing harassment measures for online contexts. We
are still committed to combatting harassment, though,
and think that identifying when and how it occurs
remain important first steps in that battle. We now turn
to promising avenues for future research.
First, we could return to the “individual users”
approach to detecting harassment. By rating tweets
from a single user we could determine whether the user
is aggressive by using existing measures. These results
could be cross-validated with the BPAQ by rating a
user’s tweets, and then having the same user complete
the BPAQ. This approach would at least measure
whether a user’s content matches their personality. One

study shows that at least one “real-life” personality trait
often thought to be associated with aggression,
narcissism (see [3,9,30,35]), persists in online
environments; this is reflected in how people scoring
high in narcissism conduct themselves on Facebook [8].
Even among the authors of this paper, however, there is
disagreement about the utility of this approach given
that people may behave differently in different online
communities where norms of behavior are different
[6,7].
Situational differences are a challenge for all
psychological measures, though, and second, we
suggest future work consider the social situation in
which users operate. For instance, we could use tweets’
context such as the volume and velocity of tweets, the
number of accounts involved in a discussion, and the
number of similar tweets sent to multiple people
simultaneously to detect harassment. Each of these
represents a way in which harassment online manifests
differently from harassment offline. Online harassment,
especially under the #GamerGate tag, often involves
many people targeting a single individual instead of one
person harassing one other person (i.e., dogpiling) and
floods of tweets [48].
Lastly, we could examine various groups or
conversations of tweets instead of focusing on
individual utterances. A coding scheme like the
Perpetrator-Act-Target (PAT) scheme [47], first
developed for detecting violence on television, could
potentially be applied to conversations. The PAT
coding scheme takes a holistic approach to coding for
violence, measuring violence at three separate levels:
(1) the individual act (with a focus on the perpetrator,
act, and target), (2) the scene in which an act(s) occurs,
and (3) the complete program that the various scenes
comprise. To apply a similar hierarchal scheme here,
coders could simultaneously label the individual tweet
within a conversation and the conversation as a whole.
This would give us a two levels of detection – the
individual tweet level and the conversation/thread level
– while still avoiding labeling individual
users/accounts.
These areas of future work represent different
approaches to improving our harassment response
tools. The first improves on the user-labeling tools,
potentially leading to new automated blocking or
muting functions. The second leverages the unique
features of online harassment to afford system-level
tools that detect a situation in which harassment is
likely to occur. The third considers the conversational
context of the tweet to both improve coding and add a
level of analysis. Approaches that combine information
about users, situations, and conversations will likely be
more effective. A combination of these approaches in
which we attend to both users and their situation will

2209

likely be most useful and emphasizes both the technical
and social aspects of the response to harassment.

2012 International Conference on and 2012 International
Confernece on Social Computing (SocialCom), (2012), 71–
80.
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Table 1. Our scale items and between-coder agreement for each item
#
1

Item
User threatens physical violence as a means of protecting the user's rights.

Agreement*
94%
94%

2
3
4
5

User threatens other people or groups of people with physical harm and/or sexual violence.
User openly expresses disagreement.
User shares personal opinions of people, groups, or institutions that the user disfavors.
User engages in or attempts to start arguments with people, groups, or social movements
that the user disagrees with.

6

User tweets potentially reputation damaging rumors about something else

94%

7

User tweets non-physical threats or threatening reactions to or about someone.

94%

8

User shares potentially embarrassing photos or videos of someone else.

88%

9

94%

10

User shares someone else's personally identifiable information.
User attacks the credibility of another person or group of people in an attempt to invalidate
the other party's stance or argument.

11

User writes retaliatory comments in response to another person or group's words or actions

69%

56%
56%
63%

63%

44%
User expresses feelings that user or a group that user belongs to is being treated unfairly
User expresses feelings of being misrepresented and/or under-represented by other people,
44%
13 groups of people, the media, etcetera.
User defends user's self or user's image, or the image of a group that the user belongs to or
31%
14 associates with.
* Agreement percentages are indicative of the overall level of between-coder agreement on all 14 ratings across 20
tweets. Kappa statistics are not provided, as they do not provide useful information given the low number of coders
per tweet.
12

Table 2. Information about our human coders
Coder ID Age Gender
Tweets Coded (N)
1
24
Man
274
2
23
Woman
306
3
37
Man
123
4
32
Woman
13
5*
27
Man
183
6
36
Man
1
* Coder 5 reported multiple ages and genders but most frequently identified as a 27-year-old man
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